The Democratic Republic of Congo is emerging as a key test of whether the United States can turn its growing interest in Africa’s critical minerals into a broader economic and strategic partnership.
Washington and Kinshasa signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in December 2025, establishing a framework for cooperation on critical minerals, infrastructure, governance and regional stability. The agreement is designed to encourage U.S. and aligned companies to participate in designated strategic projects and gives them preferential access to certain opportunities identified by the Congolese government.
The approach goes beyond securing supplies of cobalt and copper. The agreement also envisages financing infrastructure and industrial projects that could increase local value addition. The United States and DRC have been working on a list of designated strategic projects, while U.S. development institutions are expected to help mobilize capital alongside private investors and multilateral lenders.
That is already beginning to translate into commercial activity. In December, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) issued a letter of interest for a potential investment in a joint venture between DRC state miner Gécamines and commodities trader Mercuria. The proposed partnership is intended to commercialize copper, cobalt and other critical minerals while improving transparency and increasing the DRC's share of value generated from its resources.
The partnership is also connected to infrastructure. DFC has considered up to $1 billion in financing for the rehabilitation, operation and eventual transfer of the Dilolo–Sakania railway in the DRC. The line would connect with the Lobito Atlantic Railway in Angola, creating a route for minerals and other goods toward the Atlantic coast.
For Washington, the strategic logic is clear. The DRC is one of the world's most important sources of cobalt and a major copper producer, while China has established a powerful position in the country's mining industry and broader critical-minerals supply chains. Reuters reported in February that Washington was using offtake agreements and state-backed financing to challenge China's position in African copper and cobalt, with the DRC among its principal targets.
But Kinshasa is not simply choosing between Washington and Beijing. DRC Mines Minister Louis Watum Kabamba said in February that the country would seek other partners if the U.S. framework failed to produce concrete projects, stressing that the agreement remained preliminary and that Congo would not give away its resources without adequate compensation.
That position is important. DRC wants foreign capital, technology and infrastructure, but it also wants greater control over how its mineral wealth is commercialized. The country's push toward local processing and strategic mineral reserves reflects the same objective.
The challenge for the United States will therefore be turning geopolitical interest into commercially viable projects while convincing Kinshasa that the partnership delivers more than access to raw materials.
For the DRC, the opportunity is equally significant: use competition among global powers to move from being a supplier of critical minerals to becoming a more influential participant in their value chains.
