Former Democratic Republic of the Congo President Joseph Kabila’s return to the forefront of the opposition has added uncertainty to efforts to end the conflict in eastern Congo. A new political movement he leads, the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), includes the M23 armed group and says it will honor the obligations assumed by its predecessor under the Doha peace process. Whether this restructuring will help sustain negotiations remains unclear.
Launched in Goma on October 12, the FRN brings together political figures and military leaders associated with the Congo River Alliance (AFC) and M23. Corneille Nangaa, who previously headed the AFC, was named a vice president, while M23 military commander Sultani Makenga was appointed chief of staff. The movement says it aims to unite opposition forces against President Félix Tshisekedi’s government and has not ruled out the use of force.
In a statement dated October 14, the FRN announced that the AFC would be dissolved and that the new organization would assume its rights and responsibilities, including those arising from the Doha negotiations. The declaration signals an intention to maintain the existing diplomatic track, but it does not resolve the question of how the parties will engage with the new leadership.
Washington Presses for Progress in Doha
The United States has urged the Congolese government and representatives of the AFC/M23 to complete the remaining protocols under the Doha process, according to a report published by Congolese outlet Enquete.cd on October 15. Washington has also emphasized the need to respect the ceasefire and existing agreements.
The Doha framework, signed on November 15, 2025, established a basis for negotiations between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23. Several provisions still require further agreement and implementation. By declaring itself the AFC’s successor, the FRN has sought to preserve continuity in the talks. Whether the government accepts this arrangement, however, remains a key question.
The Doha negotiations are distinct from the Washington peace agreement signed by the DRC and Rwanda in June 2025. Although the two diplomatic tracks are connected, they address different parties and issues. The change in the AFC/M23’s political leadership therefore does not automatically alter the agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali.
A New Political Calculation
Kabila, who led the DRC from 2001 to 2019, has become a prominent opponent of Tshisekedi. His decision to head a movement that includes an armed group controlling territory in eastern Congo brings the country’s domestic political struggle more directly into the peace process.
For international mediators, the immediate task is to keep negotiations moving while clarifying the FRN’s role. Its pledge to carry forward the Doha process may help avoid a break in talks, but a declaration alone cannot guarantee progress or compliance on the ground.
The next test will be whether Kinshasa and the FRN can maintain dialogue and uphold the ceasefire. Until their positions become clearer, Kabila’s move marks a significant change in the political structure of the opposition, but not yet a decisive shift in the prospects for peace.
