The United States has raised the global investment ceiling of its main development finance agency to $205 billion, giving Washington greater financial flexibility to back strategic projects abroad. For Central Africa, home to major deposits of copper and cobalt, the move raises a fundamental question: will regional governments shape the terms of competition for critical minerals, or remain suppliers of resources for industrial strategies designed elsewhere?
Signed into law on December 18, 2025, the DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act increased the US International Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) maximum contingent liabilities from $60 billion to $205 billion. It also established a $5 billion revolving equity fund and expanded the agency’s authority to take minority stakes of up to 40% in companies. The $205 billion ceiling applies globally; it is not money earmarked for Africa or mining projects.
DFC already has more than $14 billion in investment commitments across Africa, with over $3 billion linked to critical minerals and related projects, according to Reuters in October 2026. The agency plans to expand direct equity investments alongside loans, guarantees and political risk insurance, giving it more ways to support projects considered strategically important to US supply chains.
One example is DFC’s proposed financing arrangement for Syrah Resources, announced in March 2026. The company operates the Balama graphite mine in Mozambique and owns an anode-material processing facility in the United States. The proposal would convert part of DFC’s existing loan into equity and provide additional funding, subject to due diligence and approvals. The plan illustrates Washington’s approach: link African mineral production to downstream processing and supply chains serving US industry.
For Central African producers, however, attracting capital is only part of the equation. A mine can increase exports without generating a comparable expansion in local processing, manufacturing or domestic supplier networks. The economic outcome depends in part on the terms governments negotiate and their ability to secure lasting benefits from projects.
That is where the region’s strategic choices come into focus. As the United States, China and other powers seek access to critical minerals, governments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and across Central Africa must decide whether to treat this competition as something happening around them or use it to advance their own industrial priorities.
That means looking beyond the headline value of investment deals. Do project agreements support local processing, workforce training and procurement from domestic businesses? Will they generate public revenue and infrastructure that serves the wider economy, rather than primarily moving minerals to export markets? Can neighboring countries coordinate energy, transport and processing investments to make regional value chains commercially viable?
The OECD’s 2026 assessment of critical minerals in Africa points to persistent barriers to moving beyond raw and semi-processed exports, including infrastructure gaps and fragmented approaches to value-chain development. Regional coordination could help countries pool resources and build processing capacity where individual markets may be too small to support it alone.
DFC’s expanded capacity does not guarantee that Central Africa will capture more value from its resources. It gives Washington a larger financial toolkit in an already established contest for critical minerals. Whether the region gains industrial capacity from that contest will depend on whether its governments can turn external demand into terms that serve their own long-term economic goals.
