Artificial intelligence is becoming a new arena of global economic power, and African countries do not want to enter it simply as consumers of technology developed elsewhere.
That concern was on display at the United Nations GA this week, where developing countries called for a greater role in shaping the rules governing AI. Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), warned that developing countries should not be reduced to users of technologies and standards designed without their participation. She argued that the technological transformation of this century should not reproduce the economic imbalances of previous decades.
The debate reflects a broader shift. AI is no longer just a technology issue. The countries and companies that control advanced models, computing capacity, data and digital infrastructure will have greater influence over how the technology develops and who captures its economic value.
For Africa, that creates a difficult challenge. The continent is seeking a stronger voice in global AI governance while still building many of the foundations needed to participate fully in the AI economy.
From Digital Policy to AI Diplomacy
The African Union is increasingly treating AI as a foreign-policy issue rather than simply a digital development agenda. In September, the African Union Commission brought African ambassadors and permanent representatives together in Geneva to coordinate the continent’s position in international negotiations on digital and AI policy. The meeting focused on developing common African positions in multilateral and plurilateral forums, including the G20, while strengthening cooperation between diplomats and technical experts. The AU also proposed creating a network of African tech diplomats.
The effort builds on the AU’s Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy, adopted in 2024. The strategy calls for stronger cooperation on AI skills, research, data, infrastructure and governance, while seeking greater African participation in shaping the global AI landscape.
That matters because decisions about AI are increasingly tied to economic interests. Rules covering data, digital infrastructure, standards, privacy and access to AI systems can affect how African businesses compete, how governments procure technology and how much value remains within African economies.
The AU is therefore trying to solve two problems at once: making sure Africa has a seat at the table and making sure its countries can act effectively once they get there.
The Capacity Gap
A diplomatic seat, however, does not automatically translate into technological influence.
A September report by the UN secretary-general found that financing for AI capacity-building remains fragmented, with major geographic gaps. It identified shortages in computing power, energy, connectivity, high-quality data, digital public infrastructure and skills, as well as weaknesses in the institutional capacity needed to assess, procure, deploy and govern AI systems.
The disparity is particularly stark in computing infrastructure. High-income countries accounted for 77% of global data-center capacity in June 2025, compared with less than 0.1% in low-income countries, according to World Bank figures cited in the UN report. Fewer than 20% of least developed countries had a national AI strategy in 2025.
For Africa, the implication is straightforward: influencing global AI rules will be harder if the continent remains heavily dependent on infrastructure, technology and expertise controlled elsewhere.
Yet building frontier AI systems is not necessarily the answer. The World Bank’s 2026 World Development Report argues that developing countries do not need to build trillion-dollar models or huge data centers to benefit from AI. They can begin by adopting existing tools and adapting them to local languages, institutions, data and development needs. That distinction is important for Africa. The continent does not need to replicate Silicon Valley to benefit from AI. But it does need enough electricity, connectivity, skills, data and institutional capacity to make imported technologies useful on local terms.
The Economic Stakes
The potential gains are substantial, but they depend on those foundations.
The IMF estimates that, at current levels of preparedness, AI would add only about 0.2% to Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP over the next decade. With stronger foundations for adoption and wider use beyond already connected firms, the gain could rise to about 4% over the same period.
That gap is more revealing than the headline potential.
AI could help African economies address some of their most persistent constraints by extending scarce expertise to places where professionals are in short supply. The IMF points to potential applications in agriculture, health care, education, small businesses and government services. In Kenya, for example, digital tools are already being used to provide farmers with weather and crop-management advice.
The World Bank similarly argues that AI could help developing economies improve medical care, education, agricultural services and government administration. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, nearly one-third of rural schools still lack reliable electricity and more than two-thirds lack reliable internet access.
Those figures highlight the real challenge. Africa’s AI future will not be determined only by the sophistication of its software. It will also depend on whether a clinic has electricity, whether a school has an internet connection, whether a farmer can access a useful service on a basic mobile phone and whether a government has the skills to evaluate the systems it buys.
A Question of Economic Influence
This is why the debate over AI governance matters beyond technology policy.
African governments are not simply asking for representation in international discussions. They are seeking a role in decisions that could shape access to data, computing resources, digital markets, standards and investment for years to come.
The AU’s push to coordinate African diplomacy on AI reflects that broader shift. Its September consultation in Geneva explicitly treated digital and AI issues as part of foreign policy, linking them to international negotiations, economic interests and the way states project influence.
But diplomatic coordination can only take Africa so far.
If African countries remain dependent on foreign platforms, imported expertise and external computing infrastructure, their ability to influence the AI economy will remain constrained even as their representatives gain a stronger presence in international negotiations.
The answer is not necessarily to build every part of the AI stack at home. The World Bank’s approach is more pragmatic: adopt useful technologies, adapt them to local conditions and gradually build the capacity to advance further where it makes economic sense.
That approach could also give Africa something more valuable than a place in the room. It could give governments and businesses the ability to negotiate from a position of greater technological and economic capacity. The global AI order is taking shape quickly. Africa is trying to influence the rules while building the capabilities needed to live with them.
Its success will depend on whether those two efforts can move forward together.
