Central Africa is facing a debt problem that is no longer confined to individual governments. As Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and Gabon confront tighter financing conditions and renewed engagement with the International Monetary Fund, pressure is spreading through the financial system that connects the six CEMAC economies.
The timing is significant. The World Bank’s latest CEMAC Economic Barometer estimates that regional growth slowed to 2.6% in 2025, from 3.2% in 2024. At the same time, the average fiscal deficit widened to 3.3% of GDP, while regional public debt remained elevated at 53.6% of GDP. Debt in Congo and Gabon was above the CEMAC ceiling of 70% of GDP.
CEMAC’s problem is not simply that some governments have borrowed heavily. The more immediate concern is how those governments are financed. Banks play a major role in the regional government securities market, creating a direct link between sovereign finances and banking-sector stability.
Cameroon provides a clear example. An IMF assessment published in April found that the CEMAC regional government securities market was nearing saturation, with weakening demand and subscription rates. Sovereign exposure was estimated at around 34% of bank assets, while private-sector lending has declined as a share of bank assets. Several banks hold more than half of their assets in claims on CEMAC governments.
That concentration creates a two-way risk. Governments depend on banks to absorb domestic debt, while banks become increasingly exposed to the fiscal position of governments. As sovereign exposure rises, banks have less capacity and incentive to extend longer-term credit to businesses, particularly smaller firms. IMF analysis explicitly links high sovereign exposure to constraints on private-sector credit in Cameroon.
The Republic of Congo illustrates the pressure more sharply. IMF data put public debt at 97.2% of GDP at the end of 2025, while newly accumulated domestic and external arrears pointed to persistent weaknesses in debt management. The Fund also warned that Congo faces significant risks from large refinancing needs, tight regional credit markets and a possible decline in regional banks’ appetite for Congolese Treasury securities.
Congo’s position matters beyond Brazzaville because regional banks are part of the government financing mechanism. If demand for Congolese securities weakens, refinancing maturing obligations could become more difficult and expensive. At the same time, banks holding large volumes of sovereign paper may have less room for private-sector lending.
Gabon presents another version of the same pressure. Libreville formally requested an IMF programme in March. Its revised 2026 budget later authorized up to $1.5 billion in international borrowing, while the projected financing gap increased to CFAF 915.6 billion (roughly $1.6 billion). Revenue projections were cut by 22%. Reuters reported that the revised fiscal plan had raised concerns among investors and could complicate negotiations with the IMF.
The renewed IMF focus on Cameroon, Congo and Gabon therefore has a regional dimension. Africa Intelligence reported on September 18 that the Fund had sent missions to all three countries over concerns about their debt levels and the risks to regional monetary stability.
CEMAC’s external position makes the situation more sensitive. Hydrocarbons still account for around 70% of regional exports, while oil exports fell 2.3% and gas exports 10.5% in 2025. External reserves declined from 4.9 to 4.2 months of import cover, below the region’s five-month adequacy threshold. In June 2026, BEAC cut its policy rate from 4.75% to 4.5%, but the World Bank said monetary transmission remained weak as banking-sector weaknesses and fiscal pressures continued to constrain private-sector credit.
Commodity dependence means a deterioration in oil and gas revenues can hit several parts of the system at once. Lower government revenues can widen financing gaps, while weaker export earnings can reduce the external buffers supporting the region’s monetary framework.
CEMAC’s challenge, therefore, is not simply to bring individual debt ratios below a particular threshold. The deeper issue is reducing governments’ dependence on a regional banking system that is itself becoming heavily exposed to sovereign risk.
Breaking that cycle will require stronger domestic revenue systems, better debt management, broader participation in government securities markets and greater use of concessional financing. IMF analysis also points to the need for deeper secondary markets and a more diversified investor base.
CEMAC has built a common monetary and financial framework that allows its member states to share regional markets and institutions. Simultaneous fiscal pressure across several major economies is now testing how resilient that framework is when governments, banks and external buffers come under pressure at the same time.
